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GIVING TEETH TO SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
IN THE INTRABRAND CONTEXT: WEANING




The evasion of antitrust liability for anticompetitive conduct in
the intrabrand market is a frequent occurrence, which receives little
to no attention from courts.' Within many intrabrand markets,
anticompetitive and monopolistic conduct is a real threat, if not
already a reality, and deserves more attention from the courts than it
currently receives.
To illustrate the problem, imagine two companies (X and Y) that
wish to provide distribution/dealership services for a group of manu-
facturers of distinct, but similar, products. Imagine, for example, that
X and Y both want to open car dealerships in the same geographic
area and BMW, Mercedes, and Lexus would all like to have their cars
sold by either X or Y.2 Because the car companies just want their
inventory sold, they do not care which one sells their cars. Now let us
assume that X has more bargaining power than Y from having leased
potential car lots in locations that are more attractive and accessible
and can thereby promise the car companies a superior presence in
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A. Philosophy
and Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 2004. Many thanks to Professor
Christine Venter who is not only a fantastic legal writing teacher, but who also has
been a mentor throughout my law school career. I also want to thank Amy for always
keeping me calm and being there for me every day. Finally, I want to thank my
parents for always encouraging me to reach higher.
1 Intrabrand competition takes place between distributors of manufacturing
firms and, as this Note will discuss, it is considered to be less of an enforcement prior-
ity than interbrand competition-competition between manufacturers. Cont'l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
2 This Note also assumes that demand for these cars is high in this area and the
nearest luxury car dealership besides Xand Yis farther than the residents of this town
are willing to drive.
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the local luxury automobile market. This sway is enough for X to con-
vince the manufacturers to enter into exclusive distributorship agree-
ments whereby the manufacturer agrees with X that it will not allow
competing dealers to sell its products where other dealers might com-
pete with X, which of course includes Y
Due to X's business acumen and excellent locations, X is able to
convince all three of the manufacturers to agree to exclusive distribu-
torships.4 For the duration of each agreement, Y, or any other com-
petitor who wishes to enter this market, will be unable to procure cars
to sell from that particular manufacturer. The more exclusive agree-
ments a firm like X is able to secure, the less variety of luxury cars
other would-be dealers will have, thus drawing customers away from
them and toward X. Eventually, new dealers seeking to enter the lux-
ury car market will find it nearly impossible to contract with one of
these manufacturers to sell their cars due to X's exclusive distributor-
ships. Additionally, if the majority of the luxury automobile manufac-
turers deal exclusively with X, entrants into the luxury dealership
business will find themselves with only a few, less popular brands,
hardly worth selling. Downstream customers will also lose out-
decreased competition among the dealerships due to the exclusive
arrangements will manifest itself in higher sticker prices and monopo-
listic premiums.
So, can Ybring a claim under section J5 or 26 of the Sherman Act
for anticompetitive dealing or monopolization against X? Although it
technically could under the current antitrust regime, Ys chances of
surviving a motion to dismiss or summary judgment would be small.
7
3 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir. 1976) ("In an
exclusive dealership arrangement a manufacturer agrees with a dealer not to author-
ize any competing dealers to sell the manufacturer's products anywhere within the
exclusive territory of the first dealer."), affd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4 It is not unreasonable to believe that a similarly situated firm would also be
motivated to capture the entire distribution market, not only by a desire to capitalize
on its superior physical presence as a selling point for exclusivity agreements with
manufacturers, but also to be able to preserve the viability of its business by bringing
in enough revenue to afford its brick and mortar storefront. Furthermore, it makes
no difference to the manufacturer so long as its product can sell in the market.
5 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (criminalizing contracts, conspiracy, and combinations in
the form of a trust that are in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations).
6 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (criminalizing the creation of a monopoly, an attempt to
monopolize, or conspiracy to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several states or with foreign nations).
7 This is because, according to the current case law, X and Ywould be classified
as intrabrand competitors, while the car manufacturers compete at the interbrand
level. Such a distinction is significant because Supreme Court precedent has focused
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As a result, firms in the intrabrand market that are the victims of collu-
sion among competing distributors and their suppliers have little
hope of vindicating their right to participate in a competitive market.
Thus, ironically, the very laws created to foster competition and pun-
ish unreasonable restraints of trade offer the very loopholes through
which intrabrand distributors are legally pushed out of the market
because, according to the courts, it serves a greater, "procompetitive"
good of increased interbrand competition and efficiency.
This Note's analysis is particularly germane in two oft-occurring
circumstances. It applies in markets with few distributors and many
manufacturers. It also applies, with much overlap, to any market
where a distributor is offering an indispensable service to its supplier,
and based on its recognition of its own necessity, the distributor insists
on exclusive vertical nonprice agreements. These agreements prevent
the supplier from allowing other distributors to carry its goods or pro-
vide its services-effectively driving the distributor's competitors out
of the market. For example, this same issue has arisen in the ticket
vending market (involving companies such as Ticketmaster) as well as
in the movie theater business, both of which will be discussed below.8
The problem, if not yet apparent, is that under the Supreme Court's
current jurisprudence, there is little to no enforcement of such
anticompetitive agreements under the Sherman Act given the Court's
infatuation with effects on interbrand competition and its apathy
toward intrabrand competition.
This Note addresses the practical impact of this trend, particu-
larly as it applies to what should be considered anticompetitive behav-
ior, and explains why such behavior is in dire need of increased
scrutiny by the courts. Anticompetitive behavior that just happens to
more heavily on the anticompetitive impact on the interbrand competition (competi-
tion between manufacturers of the same generic product) rather than on intrabrand
competition (competition between the distributors of the manufacturer's product or
service). See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715
(2007) (acknowledging that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect
interbrand competition, even at the expense of intrabrand competition); Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 748-49 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("What is most troubling about the majority's opinion is its failure to attach any
weight to the value of intrabrand competition.... Not a word in the Sylvania opinion
implied that the elimination of intrabrand competition could be justified as reasona-
ble without any evidence of a purpose to improve interbrand competition.").
8 My discussion of unregulated anticompetitive behavior in the intrabrand con-
text will be driven by these three examples (car dealerships, Ticketmaster, and movie
theaters) and will explore each of these scenarios as a way of speaking to the
intrabrand context more generally.
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fall short of the letter of the law, yet violates its spirit, should not be
sanctioned by that same law.
Part I begins this analysis by setting forth the governing legal stan-
dards for anticompetitive conduct under sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act, focusing in particular on the rule of reason analysis
employed by the Supreme Court as to nonprice vertical restraints in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.9 and on the requirements of
a monopolization claim.
Part II expands upon the legal analysis in Part I and applies it to
the hypothetical set forth above, as well as to Ticketmaster and movie
theaters. This Part will show the various ways in which dominant dis-
tributors in intrabrand markets are able to evade liability under the
Sherman Act despite anticompetitive intent and conduct. It also
reveals how the Chicago School of Economics has influenced the
Court's treatment of intrabrand competition and has led to ajurispru-
dence that readily overlooks anticompetitive actions, so long as they
take place within the intrabrand market.10
Finally, Part III recommends a possible solution that can have a
positive impact on enforcement of anticompetitive conduct falling
outside the strict language of the rules, while violating their spirit and
allowing for unreasonable restraints of trade in the intrabrand distri-
bution market. Using Lorain Journal Co. v. United States11 as a classic
example of an anticompetitive vertical restraint case, this Part con-
cludes that courts should move beyond their current preoccupation
with economic and procompetitive impacts on the interbrand market
and focus on alternative ways of considering the intrabrand problem,
especially when it is the distributor who wishes to impose the vertical
9 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10 See Jean Wegman Burns, Comment, Challenging the Chicago School on Vertical
Restraints, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 913, 913-14 (arguing that the Chicago School dismisses
detrimental effects on the intrabrand market as irrelevant since the main thrust of
antitrust law, according to the Chicago School, should be to bolster competition at
the interbrand level); see also Mark E. Roszkowski, The True Reagan Antitrust Legacy: The
End of Intrabrand Competition, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2005, at 8, http://www.abanet.
org/antitrust/at-source/05/03/05-mar05-roszkowski323.pdf ("The Chicago School
approach to vertical integration is of course consistent with its modern vertical
restraints law, which elevates supplier over small dealer interest and permits suppliers
to direct downstream competition by controlling the retail dealer's prices, territories,
locations, and customers.").
11 342 U.S. 143 (1951). For a more detailed explanation of the case and its rele-
vance to my analysis of intrabrand competition, see infra note 114 in Part III of this
Note.
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restraint on its supplier, and not the other way around.12 Analyzing
these vertical nonprice restraints in the framework of group boycotts
and unilateral refusals to deal, instead of only focusing on intrabrand
competition, is a first step toward preventing this kind of Sherman Act
evasion.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING INTERBRAND AND INTRABRAND
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLIES
This Part will set forth the governing legal standard for anticom-
petitive conduct under sections 1 (contracts in restraint of trade) and
2 (monopolies in restraint of trade) of the Sherman Act. It will dis-
cuss the use of a nonprice vertical restraint-the exclusive distributor-
ship-as a means of creating monopoly-like conditions without a
technical violation of the Sherman Act. It will focus in particular on
the rule of reason analysis, developed by the Supreme Court in Sylva-
nia, as it pertains to nonprice vertical restraints and on the require-
ments of a monopolization claim. This foundational discussion will
set the stage for Part II, where I will develop the argument that the
Supreme Court's current antitrust jurisprudence, including use of the
rule of reason and its preoccupation with stimulating interbrand com-
petition at any cost, is permitting anticompetitive behavior that should
be punished under the Sherman Act.
An exclusive distributorship exists when a supplier or manufac-
turer agrees with a dealer that it will not allow competing dealers to
sell its products where other dealers might compete with it.1 3 There
has been an overwhelming amount of case law demonstrating that a
manufacturer may grant exclusive distributorships, even if it results in
the diminution or elimination of intrabrand competitors, provided
that there is not enough evidence to make out a monopolization
claim under the Sherman Act.14 Furthermore, "[p1 er se rules of ille-
12 This will often be the case when there are few distributors for many suppliers
in a limited geographic area, especially when one of the distributors has a competitive
advantage such as widespread customer contact or superior market placement and
availability, much like in Lorain. 342 U.S. 143.
13 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir. 1976), affd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
14 Id.; see also, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963)
("'Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."' (quoting Chi. Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)));Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[I]t is well settled
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gality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is mani-
festly anticompetitive.."15 Thus, exclusive dealerships are evaluated
under the rule of reason since such arrangements are vertical non-
price restraints of trade.
1 6
A. The Rule of Reason Analysis
The rule of reason is the standard for determining whether a
practice restrains trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
17
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States... is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 18
Aspects such as the particularities of the relevant business under
consideration and "the restraint's history, nature, and effect" should
be taken into account under the rule of reason analysis.19 Another
important consideration is whether the businesses involved have mar-
ket power. 20 The purpose of this rule is to "distinguish [ ] between
restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer
and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best
interest."'2' Therefore, in order "[t] o establish a cause of action for an
that it is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws for a manufacturer or supplier to
agree with a distributor to give him an exclusive franchise, even if this means cutting
off another distributor.").
15 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
16 Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1987) (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59). The Supreme Court "noted that especially
in the vertical restraint context 'departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be
based on demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line draw-
ing.'" Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (omission in
original) (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59).
17 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007)
(citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
19 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997)).
20 Id. (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768
(1984)).
21 Id. at 2713; accord I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 57 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw] ("[T]he
inquiry tinder the rule of reason is limited to whether the restraint 'is one that pro-
motes competition or one that suppresses competition.'" (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978))).
[VOL. 84:2
INTRABRAND SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason, the plaintiff
must show" that there is an agreement between two or more persons
or business entities, that the intent behind that agreement is to unrea-
sonably restrain competition, and that the restraint actually injures
competition.
22
There are further aspects of the intrabrand market that need to
be touched on before proceeding. First, there is the issue of defining
the product. In most cases, the dealer itself does not manufacture the
product. Rather, it simply possesses the right to sell another's prod-
uct. Going back to our dealership example, from the perspective of
the manufacturer, X's "product" is its ability to sell luxury automobiles
better than its competitors can. What is being offered in exchange for
the ability to sell these cars at a mark-up above their cost is a service to
the manufacturers that involves the promotion and sale of cars they
may not have otherwise sold in this region. Therefore, the interbrand
market could be defined as the market for luxury cars in City A, while
the intrabrand market would be the market for car dealership and
sales services.
So, who are the customers? This critical factor in determining
the potential anticompetitive effect of exclusive vertical agreements is
discussed in Part II. It is a harder question than it seems because
depending on the customer's identity, there will be divergent reper-
cussions in the case of a reduction in competition.
For example, ifJoe Car-Buyer is the customer and X dealership is
the only dealer in town selling luxury cars (because of its exclusive
22 Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.
1987). There is of course some debate as to the proper standard for a rule of reason
analysis. In his article, Professor Gevurtz views the market analysis performed by the
courts in cases of vertical restraints as "more slapdash" than in other antitrust arenas.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Vertical Restraints on Competition, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 357, 363
(Supp. 2006). He points out that "it is rare in the vertical restraint context to see any
formal analysis of potential competition or the like." Id. Yet the ABA Section of Anti-
trust Law seems to disagree, saying that "[s]ince the early 1980s, lower courts have
imposed greater structure on the rule of reason analysis by casting it in terms of shift-
ing burdens of proof." ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, at 57. Under
this analysis,
[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that an agreement has
had or is likely to have a substantially adverse effect on competition. If the
plaintiff meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to pro-
duce evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the conduct. If the defen-
dant does produce evidence of procompetitive virtues, then the plaintiff
must show that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the stated objective or that the anticompetitive effects nonetheless
outweigh the procompetitive virtues.
Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted).
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distributorships), then Car-Buyer may end up paying more than he
otherwise would have had Y also been allowed to sell the manufac-
turer's cars.23  Car-Buyer, however, may not have legal recourse
against X for anticompetitive pricing if Car-Buyer is not considered to
be X's consumer base. This is because courts are not concerned with
the fact that Car-Buyer would bear the brunt of X's anticompetitive
vertical agreements. Rather, because X offers dealership services, it is
conceivable that courts would consider the manufacturers to be X's
intended customers instead of Car-Buyer. Courts are presently fixated
on finding anticompetitive behavior only when interbrand competi-
tion is negatively impacted. 24 Because only intrabrand competition is
suffering in our hypothetical, Car-Buyer is without recourse so long as
competition is thriving at the level that concerns courts: the inter-
brand level.
Finally, there is the issue of exactly what kind of relationship the
dealer has to the manufacturer. Let's assume Xand Yare not techni-
cally reselling the cars, because they never purchased them from the
manufacturer. Rather, they have contracted to sell the available cars
and thus could be viewed as a brokerage service for the
manufacturers.
Another possibility is consignment where the "supplier retained
tide, dominion and risk of loss with respect to its products. '25 How-
ever, according to the Court in Sylvania, such "formalistic line draw-
ing," when it comes to restricting sales and consignment transactions,
is no longer appropriate because nonprice vertical restraints must be
evaluated according to the rule of reason, and thus "upon demonstra-
ble economic effect.
' 26
The rule of reason analysis only focuses on the vitality of inter-
brand competition. 27 Moreover, given the lack of Supreme Court
23 If Xand Ywere selling in the same area, then they would compete for custom-
ers by offering incentives such as rebates and generally lower prices. X, however, left
to its own devices as the sole dealer in City A, would raise its prices, to the extent that
the consumer would swallow the increase.
24 See, e.g., infra notes 33-35.
25 Michael J. Denger et al., Vertical Price, Customer and Territorial Restrictions, in
48TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITuTE 295, 374 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B-1602, 2007).
26 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
27 Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399 (explaining that under a rule of rea-
son, certain vertical nonprice restraints will be held harmless "if they are likely to
promote interbrand competition without overly restricting intrabrand competition").
The frequent findings of reasonableness in the context of vertical restraints is a result
of the Supreme Court's repeatedly confirming that the primary purpose of the anti-
trust laws is to protect interbrand competition, often at the expense of intrabrand
INTRABRAND SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
review on this issue, lower courts have been left with little guidance
regarding the application of the rule of reason to vertical intrabrand
contexts. 28 An application of the rule of reason is discussed in Part
I.C.
B. The Movie Clearance As a Useful Analogy
One way to more fully flesh out the anticompetitive issues that
can arise in the intrabrand context is to take a closer look at an
intrabrand market that has been subject to some scrutiny by the
courts. It is therefore worthwhile to focus on the relationships
between movie production companies and the theaters that show the
movies to the public. The relevant nonprice vertical restraint used
between production companies and theaters is the "clearance."
The clearance is a vertical restriction used in agreements between
movie studios and exhibitors that grants a movie theater obtaining the
clearance an exclusive right to exhibit a movie at any given time.
29
This restrictive covenant is analogous to our hypothetical car dealers,
X and Y Through exclusive distributorship agreements, while one of
the dealers is selling cars to the public for a particular manufacturer,
the agreement would preclude that manufacturer from using other
dealerships in the area.30 Countless courts have recognized that
exclusive licensing agreements-known as clearances-intentionally
and justifiably discriminate between competitors at the intrabrand dis-
tribution level.3 1 Likewise, it is the nature of all business agreements
and contracts to exclude other firms and restrain competition to some
extent, and therefore courts have construed section 1 of the Sherman
Act as prohibiting only those agreements that constitute an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade.3 2 Such vertical restraints are reasonable if they
competition. See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir.
1996) (citing Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722-23 (3d Cir. 1991);
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36).
28 See Gevurtz, supra note 22, at 377. Some suggestions on how to better enforce
anticompetitive behavior are provided below in Part II.
29 Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1397.
30 For example, X could have a clause in one of its exclusive distribution agree-
ments where, for a specified amount of time (the duration of the contract), it would
be the sole provider of retail sales of that particular car in a given geographic region.
The duration of these exclusivity agreements factors into a court's analysis of the
anticompetitive nature of such exclusivity. See infra Part I.D.
31 See Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399.
32 See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1366 (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
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are "likely to promote interbrand competition without overly restrict-
ing intrabrand competition.
' 33
According to the Supreme Court in Sylvania, intrabrand competi-
tion (the competition that takes place between distributors of manu-
facturing firms' products) is considered to be less of an enforcement
priority than interbrand competition: (competition between
manufacturers) 34
For example, one way for an intrabrand competitor's exclusivity
agreement to survive scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act is if
the agreement results in increased interbrand competition despite the
corresponding decrease or elimination of intrabrand competition.
3 5
In Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific Theatres, Inc.,36 the owner of a
movie theater brought suit against a competing exhibitor and several
movie distributors, alleging that the clearances granted by the distrib-
utors violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.37 The court held that the
clearances were not unreasonable restraints of trade, however,
because though they reduced intrabrand competition to a minor
degree, they also encouraged interbrand competition by forcing
Theee Movies of Tarzana to find alternative movies to exhibit and pro-
mote. 38 The court also noted that the distributors had a legitimate
business interest in the revenue generated by the theaters they
licensed because the distributors were paid, in part, out of each
movie's gross profits.3 9 Therefore, the clearances reflected reasonable
business decisions on both sides of the transaction.
40
33 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1982).
Reasonableness in such circumstances is a result of the Supreme Court's repeatedly
confirming in vertical restraint cases that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is
to protect interbrand competition, often at the expense of intrabrand competition.
Orson, 79 F.3d at 1368 (citing Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715,
722-23 (3d Cir. 1991); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 36 (1977)).
34 See Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
35 See id. at 54 (noting that interbrand competition can be enhanced "by allowing
the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products"
that result from such nonvertical price restraints). But see Gevurtz, supra note 22, at
377-78 ("[C]ontrary to the traditional notion that the rule of reason is supposed to
balance anti- and pro-competitive impacts from the restraint in question, lower Fed-
eral courts ... have not demanded a showing of pro-competitive justifications .....
36 828 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987).
37 Id. at 1397-98.
38 Id. at 1399.
39 Id. at 1399-1400.
40 Id. at 1400. Again, this is one of the factors that a court may analyze in order
to determine whether or not there is any merit to the exclusive dealing relationship.
See, e.g., Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1569 n.37 (11th Cir.
1991) ("In applying the rule of reason, the factfinder takes into account 'the facts
[VOL. 84:2
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Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.4 1 involved a similar relationship
between a movie distributor and various theaters that exhibited the
films. In Orson, the court again looked to the interbrand competitive
effects of the clearances involved as the touchstone of the rule of rea-
son.4 2 The Orson Court found significant that competition in that
market thrived at both the distributor and exhibitor levels 43: "[I] t is
the indisputable existence of alternative sources of supply for the
[plaintiff theater] which negates the existence of anticompetitive
effects in this case."'44  Though the clearances certainly reduced
intrabrand competition to some degree by disallowing the plaintiff
from showing on a first-run basis any Miramax film that the defendant
theater had selected, they "undeniably promoted interbrand competi-
tion by requiring the [plaintiff] to seek out and exhibit the films of
other distributors, which it consistently accomplished," thereby afford-
ing art film consumers more movies from which to chose.
4 5
C. Application of the Rule of Reason
The analysis of X's desired market behavior is similar to the above
clearance cases insofar as it involves a supplier who is willing to give
exclusive rights to a distributor for a set duration.4 6 Courts take a
strong stance toward fostering interbrand competition when evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of a vertical restraint on trade.4 7 Orson and
Theee Movies of Tarzana, however, are potentially distinguishable
because both clearance agreements resulted in an increase in inter-
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable.'" (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918))).
41 79 F.3d 1358 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, Orson, Inc., the owner of various theaters,
brought a suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act against Miramax, alleging that
Miramax had conspired with another theater by entering into exclusive first-run
screening agreements with them in order to drive Orson, Inc. out of business. Id. at
1361.
42 Id. at 1372 ("[W]e conclude that the reasonableness of a clearance under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act depends on the competitive stance of the theaters involved
and the clearance's effect on competition, especially the interbrand competition which, as





46 Whether or not the car manufacturers are in fact willing participants in such
exclusive dealings and how the potential for "coercive conduct" should play into a
court's analysis will be discussed in Part II.
47 Orson, 79 F.3d at 1372.
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brand competition and, consequently, more choice for the down-
stream consumer.
48
By comparison, X's hypothetical exclusivity agreements with the
car manufacturers would inevitably reduce intrabrand competition by
reducing "competition between the distributors ... of the product of
a particular manufacturer,"49 as a result of Ys inability to also sell cars
made by the same manufacturers with which X deals exclusively.
50
Furthermore, there exists the incentive to eliminate free riding by
48 Id. ("Although the Miramax-Ritz clearances most certainly reduced intrabrand
competition[,] ... they undeniably promoted interbrand competition by requiring
the [theater] to seek out and exhibit the films of other distributors .... Thus ....
the record conclusively establishes that the clearances did not produce the anticom-
petitive effects the Sherman Act was designed to prevent."); Theee Movies of Tarzana
v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The Galleria's clearances
reduced intrabrand competition . . . . However, they also encouraged interbrand
competition by forcing TMT to find alternative subrun movies to exhibit and to pro-
mote.... The clearances were a sound business practice for Pacific and the distribu-
tors."); see also NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES § 3, at 6
(1995) [hereinafter NAAG GUIDELINES], available at http://www.naag.org/assets/
files/pdf/at-vrest guidelines.pdf (explaining the potential effects of vertical
restraints on trade). The NAAG GUIDELINES stated that the basis of the Court's ruling
in Sylvania "was its recognition of a growing body of economic literature" which
found that certain vertical restraints could actually result in increased competition
among manufacturers or suppliers of competing brands. Id. The Court set in place a
"rule of reason analysis" which was to "balance any pro-competitive interbrand effects
against the diminution or elimination of intrabrand competition, which vertical
restraints always intentionally cause." Id.
49 Orson, 79 F.3d at 1368 n.10 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)).
50 Courts do not often make clear how such agreements would actually result in a
concomitant increase in interbrand competition, sparing the restrictive agreement
Sherman Act scrutiny. See NAAG GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3.2A, at 8 ("By dimin-
ishing or extinguishing intrabrand competition, a supplier may provide existing or
new dealers with the incentive to devote additional effort to advertising, services and
other forms of product enhancement and differentiation."); ABA SEcTION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW, supra note 21, 150 n.842 ("'Restrictions on intrabrand competition can
actually enhance market-wide competition by fostering vertical efficiency and main-
taining the desired quality of a product."' (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc.
v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1995))). But see NAAG GUIDELINES,
supra note 48, § 3.2A, at 8 n.30 ("Recent empirical studies have cast some doubt on
the oft-stated generalization that the net welfare effect of lessening intrabrand compe-
tition will be favorable." (citing Willard F. Mueller, The Sealy Restraints: Restrictions on
Free Riding or Output?, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1255 (1989))); cf. Gevurtz, supra note 22, at
362 ("Despite urging from academic commentators ... vertical restraint cases in the
United States, by and large, do not reflect a structured analysis of pro- and anti-com-
petitive impacts from the restraint.").
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other dealers. 5' Then again, it is also possible that such agreements
would not have the effect of increased interbrand competition
because Xis the dominant player in the market and could foreseeably
undercut all of the other distributors, thus virtually destroying
intrabrand competition without a complementary increase in inter-
brand competition.
52
51 This incentive usually exists in tandem with the other potential promotions of
interbrand competition that can occur as a result of an exclusive distributorship
agreement. Compare ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 154 n.872
("[M]anufacturers can use restraints to induce distributors to invest capital and effort,
to supply service and repair facilities needed to market the manufacturer's products
effectively, and to engage in promotional activities, all of which seek to increase sales
of the manufacturer's products." (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55), and Gevurtz, supra
note 22, at 361 (arguing that manufacturers restrict competition among dealers in
their products in order "to encourage provision of various services or other promo-
tional efforts by [the] dealers-the incentive for which would be undermined if some
dealers offered cut-rate prices while free-riding on the services or other promotional
efforts of the higher priced dealers"), with NAAG GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3.2B,
at 9 ("The free-ride phenomenon is much disputed among theorists, especially with
regard to certain products for which servicing or product enhancement is highly
unlikely. Others have argued that free-riding could be eliminated through less
restrictive means such as contract provisions or promotional fees."). This comparison
brings to light a potential Catch-22 with procompetitive results of vertical nonprice
restraints insofar as such agreements may stimulate interbrand promotion while at
the same time creating the free-riding problem that the restraint may have been
designed to eliminate. As applied to the car dealership hypothetical, the elimination
of free-riding would most likely not be a valid procompetitive benefit since, as noted
in the NAAG GUIDELINES, the "product" at issue (the service of selling the manufac-
turers' cars) does not lend itself to servicing or product enhancement (nor does Tick-
etmaster's ticketing service or a movie theater's screening of a particular film).
Moreover, a dealer like Xis not necessarily in competition with other dealers who sell
cars at a different price point and therefore would not "reap the benefits of such
[promotional] services performed by other dealers." NAAG GUIDELINES, supra note
48, § 3.2B, at 8.
52 See NAAG GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3.3C, at 10 ("Vertical restraints can
raise entry barriers, erect new barriers and force competitors to operate inef-
ficiently."). In this section, the Guidelines are referring to when the dominant firms in
an affected market bind available dealers to exclusive dealing arrangements, such that
other rival firms could not enter the market. In the world of Xand Ycar dealers (as
with Ticketmaster), it is the dealerships (not the manufacturers) that are interested in
locking down the exclusive distributorships in order to protect their market share.
Given these vertical restraints, any existing or incoming car dealers are going to find
far more difficult entry into the intrabrand market of factory-direct car dealing. The
same occurs in the case of Ticketmaster because it has all of the desired venues locked
up in exclusive ticketing arrangements.
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D. The Duration of Exclusive Agreements
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets. corn Inc. 53 the court, using the rule
of reason analysis, did not find Ticketmaster in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, despite its six-year-long exclusive venue con-
tracts.5 4 This case embodies a useful rubric for structuring exclusive
dealership arrangements in order to avoid an unreasonable restraint
of trade under the law. In finding the exclusive agreements at issue
not violative of section 1, the court considered the following to be
mitigating factors: there was "substantial competitive bidding" for
exclusive vendor contracts; entry into the market was not "unduly dif-
ficult"; and any deviations from fully competitive bidding were not
"'likely to be of significant magnitude.'- 55 Furthermore, foreclosure
of competition was not found to be excessive in light of the fact that
"on average, 16% of Ticketmaster's venues, or 26% of the top 150
venues, come up for renewal in any given year. '5 6 This is not so low as
to preclude entry: "'[A] 11 customers might contract to buy exclusively
from incumbents and yet allow effective entry if 20 percent of the con-
tracts expire monthly (or even annually)."' 5 7 Thus, by staggering the
termination dates of their various exclusive agreements, while still hav-
ing at least twenty percent of them coming due monthly, X could
place a monopolistic hold on the market while still evading liability
under the Sherman Act.
58
E. Monopolization Framework
Beyond the unreasonable restraint of interbrand competition, X
may also face being considered a monopoly under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Section 2 states in relevant part: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a
felony .... "59
53 127 F. App'x 346 (9th Cir. 2005).
54 Id. at 347-48.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 348.
57 Id. (quoting Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1997)).
58 See infra Part II.B.
59 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
0
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A showing of market power requires the ability "'to control prices
or exclude competition. ' ' 60 To prevail on a section 2 monopoly
claim, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant possesses
the requisite monopoly power and has achieved, increased, or sus-
tained that power through exclusionary conduct.61 Furthermore, to
prevail on a section 2 attempt claim, the plaintiff is required to estab-
lish that the defendant "(1) engaged in exclusionary conduct, (2) with
a specific intent to monopolize, and (3) with a 'dangerous probability'
of achieving monopoly power."62 A showing of market power through
circumstantial evidence requires the plaintiff to define the relevant
market, demonstrate that the defendant possesses a dominant share
of it, and determine that there are substantial barriers to entry.
63
In Ticketmaster, the court did not find that Ticketmaster had
acquired or maintained market power through exclusionary conduct
as a basis for monopolization or attempted to monopolize claims
under the Sherman Act.64 The rate at which the exclusive contracts
with venues came up for renewal each year-sixteen percent for all of
their venues or twenty-six percent for their top 150 venues-was not
so low as to preclude entry by competitors.
65
A barrier to entry is "either a cost that would have to be borne by
an entrant that was not and is not borne by the incumbent or any
condition that is likely to inhibit other firms from entering the market
on a substantial scale in response to an increase in the incumbent's
60 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th
Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)).
Courts will often use the phrases "market power" and "monopoly power" synony-
mously and without distinction. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, at
226 & n.10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But see Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) ("Monopoly power
under § 2 requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1.");
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, at 226 n.10 ("Neither Kodak nor the
lower court decisions, however, explain where market power ends and monopoly
power begins."). Given the ambivalent precedent, I will be using the two interchange-
ably for our purposes here.
61 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
62 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 225 (quoting Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)). Market power can be proven by
either direct or circumstantial evidence of control over prices or exclusion of compe-
tition. Id. at 229. However, given the limited availability of direct evidence, courts
generally look to circumstantial evidence. Id.
63 Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d
1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)).
64 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 127 F. App'x 346, 348 (9th Cir. 2005).
65 Id.
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prices."66 Some examples of barriers to entry include small markets
incapable of supporting more firms, nonprice vertical restraints (such
as exclusive dealerships), and high startup costs. 6 7 Without substan-
tial barriers to entry, monopolistic prices will not be sustained because
even with the eradication of one's competition, the increase in prices
will entice new competitors into the market who are willing to accept
a lower price for their goods and services. 68 "Even a 100% monopolist
may not exploit its monopoly power in a market without entry barri-
ers."' 69 Part II examines how X can once again evade liability under
section 2 of the Sherman Act due to the peculiarities of this market.
II. AVOIDING SHERMAN ACT LIABiLITY GIVEN THE COURT'S
PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERBRAND COMPETITION
This Part expands upon the legal analysis in Part I and applies it
to the hypothetical set forth above in order to show the various ways in
which firms in the position of X are able to evade liability under the
Sherman Act despite anticompetitive intent and conduct. It also
reveals how the Chicago School of Economics has influenced the
Court's treatment of intrabrand competition and has led to ajurispru-
dence that readily overlooks anticompetitive actions, so long as they
take place within the intrabrand market.
Under the foregoing analysis, which compared the hypothetical
relationship of two car dealers and their exclusive agreements with
manufacturers to the clearance relationship between movie theaters
and studios as well as to Ticketmaster's market, it seems unlikely that a
court would find the exclusivity agreements sought by either car deal-
66 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 233 & n.42.
67 Id. at 234-35 ("The presence of any of these barriers to entry may not, by itself,
be sufficient to establish monopoly power."); see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tick-
ets.Com, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,013, at 96,241 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
("[B]rand name recognition or reputation alone is not considered a barrier to entry
.... ), affd, 127 F. App'x 346 (9th Cir. 2005).
68 United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Metro
Mobile CTS, Inc. v. NewVector Commc'ns, Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989));
accord Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) ("The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short
period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth.").
69 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing L.A. Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir.
1993)); see also Ticketmaster, 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 96,241 ("Size alone or heavy
market share alone does not make one a monopolist (or in danger of becoming
one). . . . There must be evidence of the ability to control process or exclude
competitors.").
[VOL. 84:2
INTRABRAND SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
ership company to unreasonably restrain trade. This would be true,
however, only if the court were to focus on the reduction of inter-
brand competition as a result of the vertical restraints. A great num-
ber of courts focus on whether a particular restraint lessens
interbrand competition in the relevant market overall, and the same
courts simultaneously hold that negative impacts on intrabrand com-
petition are inadequate on their own to be considered violations of
section 1.70 Through the exclusive distribution agreements sought by
companies such as X, the only market that is ostensibly being
restrained is that of the intrabrand distribution market for luxury
automobiles in City A. However, "[r]obust interbrand competition
will provide a significant check on any increase in intrabrand market
power resulting from the implementation of vertical nonprice
restraints. '71 The reasoning behind this conclusion is that if any of
the distributors, through these vertical restraints, gains market
power,72 driving up prices at the retail or wholesale level, then custom-
ers in a highly competitive interbrand market would quickly shift to a
competitor's product and thus to a different distributor, effectively
undercutting whatever market power was gained through the initial
restraint.
70 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, at 154-55 & n.876 (citing vari-
ous cases which have held or observed that antitrust law's main priority is interbrand
competition and that, if there is strong interbrand competition, then a negative effect
on intrabrand competition is not relevant to the court's reasonable restraint of trade
inquiry). This same footnote, however, does observe several cases where courts have
held that though a detrimental effect on intrabrand competition may not be enough
on its own to render a vertical nonprice restraint unreasonable, if coupled with con-
siderable or strong market power by the seller or supplier, that same lessening of
intrabrand competition can be dispositive for the determination of an unreasonable
restraint of trade. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560,
1571-72 & n.20 (11th Cir. 1983); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068,
1080-81 (2d Cir. 1980); Lawrence T. Festa, III, Comment, Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Empire?, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 619, 649 & nn.174-75 (1993) (observing that after Sylvania, so long as
competition thrived in the interbrand market, vertical restraints that limited
intrabrand competition were presumed lawful). But see Gevurtz, supra note 22, at 378
(noting that courts construe antitrust laws as being "only concerned with interbrand
competition .. . rendering the reduction in intrabrand competition irrelevant").
71 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 150 (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp.
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977); Ezzo's Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 243 F.3d
980, 987 (6th Cir. 2001)).
72 Monopoly power is "'the power to control prices or exclude competition."'
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 225 (quoting United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). Market power and monopoly
power are being used synonymously here. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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A. Finding a Safe Harbor in the Judicial Preoccupation with Interbrand-
and Not Intrabrand-Competition
Many intrabrand contexts deviate from the traditional roles of
interbrand/intrabrand competition set forth in Sylvania.73 For exam-
ple, consider the relationship Ticketmaster has with its customer
venues. The events for which Ticketmaster makes tickets available are
not like the generic products of different manufacturers insofar as
they are not fungible items, like televisions. Rather, they are each dis-
tinct, providing a different experience. Therefore, consumers are not
necessarily free to substitute a different brand of the same product, as
they would have been able to do in Sylvania.7 4 In any intrabrand mar-
ket-like that of Ticketmaster-with few dealers and many manufac-
turers, regardless of how robust the interbrand competition is, if one
dealer is able to work out exclusive distribution agreements because of
some competitive advantage, then the customer will have only one
choice of where to go for any given need.
On the other hand, the customers would still be getting what they
needed from whichever dealer struck the distributorship agreement
with the supplier. Thus, there may not be a concomitant procompeti-
tive benefit in the interbrand market that could offset this decrease in
intrabrand competition; but, in light of the understanding that non-
price vertical restraints always intentionally reduce intrabrand compe-
tition,75 it seems that so long as such effects are relegated to the
intrabrand market, 76 and the customer is able to procure what it wants
at a reasonable price (if not slightly inflated),77 the exclusivity prac-
tices of such an intrabrand distributor would evade a court's finding
of an unreasonable vertical restraint.
The intrabrand market, however, does not always lend itself to
the conventional Sylvania analysis. 78 It is not that the manufacturers
73 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. As has already been discussed in this Note, the
movie theater business, the event ticketing market, and, at least hypothetically, the car
dealership market, as well as any similarly situated markets, are susceptible to the
analysis provided in this Note with respect to intrabrand competition.
74 Id.
75 NAAG GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3, at 3.
76 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77 See Louis M. Solomon & Robert D. Joffe, Exclusive Distribution and Antitrust, 53
FoRDHM L. REv. 491, 504 (1984) ("[A]ntitrust laws were enacted for the 'protection
of competition, not competitors.'" (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962))). "[I]n looking at the impact on competition, consumer welfare is
the primary reference point." Solomon & Joffe, supra, at 504; cf. supra note 48 and
accompanying text (demonstrating the importance of downstream consumer choice).
78 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
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want to deal exclusively with X or Y, thus limiting the dealerships'
distribution potential. Rather, it is rational to assume that distributors
would want their cars available to the public at varying prices and loca-
tions in order to cover the scope of the market. Instead, it is the com-
pany in X's position that would want to lock the different
manufacturers into exclusive distribution agreements such that the
customers have to get their luxury automobiles through X alone, thus
maximizing profit from the increased amount it can add to the sticker
price as a result of being the only show in town for such cars.
79
The question remains as to whether this kind of analysis by the
courts would leave X free to restrain the intrabrand market as it
pleases without any judicial repercussions. X, or any firm similarly sit-
uated (like Ticketmaster), should not be able to evade its duty to com-
port with antitrust law simply by virtue of its unique position in the
market. Yet under the current rule of reason regime, it is possible,
without some refiguring of the analysis by the courts, that X could get
away with practically any kind of exclusivity agreement so long as
interbrand competition were left intact.80 A possible solution to this
dearth of antitrust enforcement of restraints of intrabrand competi-
tion will be discussed in Part III.
79 Cf Kenneth L. Glazer & Brian R. Henry, Coercive vs. Incentivizing Conduct: A
Way Out of the Section 2 Impasse?, 18 ANTITRUST 45, 49 (2003) ("It should by now be a
given in antitrust cases that every firm in every industry is at all times doing everything
it can to drive competitors out of the market."); id. ("'Every competitor seeks to cap-
ture as much business as possible.'" (quoting Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))).
80 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. This shift in the Court's reasoning
from Schwinn's more formalistic analysis to the more functional approach of Sylvania
reflects the prevalence at the time of the "Chicago school critique of vertical restraints
on intrabrand competition," Gevurtz, supra note 22, at 361, and its acceptance by the
Court. Moreover, as astutely observed by Burns:
Under the Chicago approach, a court need not try to balance or assess issues
of dealer coercion, unequal bargaining power, the multi- or single-brand
nature of the dealer, or competition in the intrabrand market. The Chicago
school dismisses all such concerns as irrelevant. Instead, provided that there
is a modicum of interbrand competition, a court can justify upholding any
vertical restraint.
Burns, supra note 10, at 913-14. In this comment, the author also notes that "a series
of Supreme Court decisions made it almost impossible for dealers to successfully
bring such actions" challenging vertical restraints. Id. at 914 n.4. Burns' fears can
find only confirmation in another recent shift by the Supreme Court in Iegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). There, the Court overruled
the longstanding precedent of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911), which had held that vertical minimum price fixing agreements were
per se illegal. Now, such vertical price restraints have been added to the menagerie
of plaintiff friendly rule of reason analysis.
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B. Duration of Exclusive Agreements and Terminability As a Safe Harbor
The circumstances of Ticketmaster were similar to the situation
that either of our hypothetical car dealers would face insofar as they
are dealing with a manufacturer that gave them an exclusive contract
to sell a particular product. Therefore, either of them may be able to
enter successfully into these exclusive agreements so long as they stay
within the boundaries of what the Ticketmaster court found acceptable.
This includes the existence of competitive bidding on at least a yearly,
if not monthly, cycle where close to a quarter of their exclusive con-
tracts come up for renewal.8 1 It also includes low barriers of entry
into the market by competitors. 8 2 This, however, does not take into
account the potential market foreclosure created by staggered expira-
tion dates for such exclusive arrangements.
If X's exclusive agreements were to expire at varied dates, a new
dealership entering the market would experience significant difficulty
in establishing sufficient distributorship agreements to sustain its busi-
ness.83 Regardless, the view adopted by a majority of courts is that
short-term exclusive dealerships are unlikely to bar rival distributor
firms from the market.8 4 Thus, by properly structuring such exclusiv-
81 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 127 F. App'x 346, 347-48 (9th Cir.
2005).
82 "Many courts .. focus on the agreement's duration. Agreements with short
terms and providing short notice for termination have often been upheld on the pre-
mise that the competitive effects of short term or easily terminable foreclosure are
likely to be minimal .. " ABA SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 219-20
(footnotes omitted); accord Gevurtz, supra note 22, at 382 ("The duration of the con-
tracts is of prominent importance here-the notion being that if the buyers can ter-
minate the contracts on short notice, then competitors can still enter the market by
persuading buyers to terminate their exclusive dealing contracts .... ).
83 Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 YALE J. ON
REG. 169, 198 (2006). Judge Easterbrook rejected this argument in Menasha Corp. v.
News America Marketing In-Store Services, Inc., 354 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2004):
One might think that staggered expiration dates make entry easier; Menasha
(or any other rival) can sign up chains as their exclusives expire, without
having to enroll the entire retail industry at one go. But, as Menasha sees
things, the different expiration dates make it harder for a rival to sign up the
whole retail industry at one time. (Menasha does not notice the irony that
under its reasoning this sign-up-everyone strategy would create an unlawful
monopoly. Perhaps Menasha should thank NAMIS for keeping it on the
straight and narrow.)
Id. at 663. Therefore, "[a]s long as contracts are of short duration, the competitive
process for distribution is fair to both incumbents and rivals and should be left
alone." Wright, supra, at 200.
84 Wright, supra note 83, at 202 n.139 (citing various cases from the First, Second,
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which "have embraced the notion that contracts
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ity agreements-where twenty percent of all contracts come up for
renewal each year and are terminable upon short notice by the sup-
plier/manufacturer-dealers like Ticketmaster will continue to be
able to enter into such arrangements without being branded as
anticompetitive.8 5 This outcome, however, still begs the question as to
the manner in which X is able to negotiate such contracts and
whether exploitation of the peculiarities of the market and its domi-
nant physical presence should be allowed under the rule of reason.
The Court's current bent toward ignoring detrimental effects on
intrabrand competition would allow-and has allowed-such
exploitation. 86 A suggestion as to how to address this avoidance of
liability for anticompetitive/monopolistic conduct is discussed in Part
III.
C. Escaping Monopoly Liability Based on Market and Firm Size
Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that a business is
free to choose those with whom it will deal so long as its motivation is
free from monopolistic purpose.87 Applying the market power
rubric"" to our dealership example, it can be argued that if there are
no significant barriers to entry, X will not be considered a monopoly
under section 2. The key factor in defining the relevant market is
determining whether significant competition exists.89 In Ticketmaster,
the relevant market was the ticket brokerage business. Determination
of the market in other intrabrand contexts, however, will not always
be so simple. For example, in the movie theater business discussed in
Part II.B, the market could be narrowly defined as supply and demand
for one particular movie being shown at any given point in time. This
means that each clearance agreement between the theater and pro-
duction studio would form its own microcosmic market for that one
terminable in less than one year are either presumptively legal or most likely are una-
ble to foreclose rivals").
85 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, 219 nn.1273-74.
86 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
87 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); see also NYNEX Corp.
v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) ("The freedom to switch suppliers lies close
to the heart of the competitive process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage.");
GTE Sylvania Inc., v. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[A]bsent
sufficient evidence of monopolization, a manufacturer may legally grant such an
exclusive franchise, even if this effects the elimination of another distributor."), affjd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
88 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
89 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th
Cir. 1997); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, at 228 ("A relevant market
has both product and geographic dimensions." (foomote omitted)).
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movie showing at that time. On the other hand, a court could also
expand its view of the market to include all theaters in the area show-
ing any given movie at any time. As will be discussed below in Part III,
if courts were to narrow their conception of the relevant market in the
nonprice vertical restraint context and just focus on an exclusive dis-
tributorship agreement as its own market for that particular good at
any given time, it would finally give teeth to the Court's current rule
of reason analysis as it applies to the intrabrand market.90
An evaluation of a firm's market share provides a relevant under-
standing of its influence and power in the market relative to the influ-
ence and power of other firms.91 This is because having a dominant
market share is usually coextensive with the ability to restrict output,
thereby controlling prices. 92 Generally, courts have required at least a
sixty-five percent market share in order to establish a prima facie case
of market power.
93
Let us assume that while X controls over sixty-five percent of the
luxury car market in City A, it does not have the corresponding power
to control prices and output because these variables are determined
largely by the manufacturer. 94 As the Court in United States v. Syufy
Enterprises95 pointed out, "[a] high market share, though it may ordi-
narily raise an inference of monopoly power, will not do so in a mar-
ket with low entry barriers or other evidence of a defendant's inability
to control prices or exclude competitors."96
This appears to be the likely case with X. If it were indeed able to
establish a monopoly in the luxury automobile market in City A and
subsequently tried to raise prices, there would not be any barrier to
90 See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
91 Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1206.
92 Id.
93 Id. (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946)). There
seems to be some margin of error here. The ABA Section of Antitrust Law's survey of
court cases found that courts can very well go either way when market shares are
between fifty percent and seventy percent. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra
note 21, at 232 & n.39. Thus, it seems that anything above seventy percent would
generally establish at least a presumption of market power.
94 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, at 226 ("'[T]he material
consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are raised
and that competition actually is excluded, but that power exists to raise prices or to
exclude competition when it is desired to do so.'" (quoting Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at
811)).
95 104 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
96 United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990). This is likely
the case with Ticketmaster because it controls neither how many seats are available
nor the face value of the tickets. Rather, it only controls its end of the transaction-
the ticket service charge.
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another competitor entering the market by setting up its own dealer-
ship. The only potential barrier to entry would be if X were somehow
able to enter into exclusivity agreements with every luxury car manu-
facturer in the area. Even then, when the agreements expired
(regardless of staggered termination dates), the market would
become fluid, providing opportunities for competitors to lure some of
X's manufacturers away, as occurred with the venue contracts in
Ticketmaster.
97
Furthermore, depending on a particular dealer's business model,
market entry will not always be prohibitively expensive. For example,
a competitor of Ticketmaster does not need a brick and mortar
storefront to operate this kind of business. It is therefore conceivable
that a company with nothing more than a website, an advertising
scheme, and a firm handshake could lure some of Ticketmaster's
venues away from their exclusive agreements upon termination. This
conclusion is bolstered by the district court's holding in Ticketmaster
Corp. v. Tickets. Corn, Inc.98 In Ticketmaster, the district court held that
while exclusive long-term contracts combined with brandname recog-
nition can be formidable barriers to entry, alone they are insufficient
to constitute an exercise of monopoly power.99 Therefore, new
entrants, despite the name recognition of X and Yin the car dealing
business or Ticketmaster's name in the ticketing business, could
potentially enter the market.
Ultimately, it is not a firm's market share that is relevant to the
monopoly analysis, but rather its ability to keep hold of that market
share.' 00 It is counterintuitive that any given intrabrand dealer would
be able to control prices in a market where the manufacturers could
just as easily either use a different distributor or publicize their prod-
ucts themselves, thereby cutting the distributor out of the picture. In
addition, in many vertical restraint contexts, as with Ticketmaster for
example, the venues it deals with already fix the prices at which the
tickets are sold and ticketing companies can only sell them for face
value, plus any additional service fee. Therefore, in many instances,
the inquiry about controlling price is limited to the service fee
charged or commission made above the price set by the manufac-
97 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
98 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,013 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affid, 127 F. App'x 346
(9th Cir. 2005).
99 Id. at 96,241.
100 Syufy, 903 F.2d at 666 (citing Oahu Gas Serv., Inc., v. Pac. Res. Inc., 838 F.2d
360, 366 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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turer/supplier. 10 1 If Ticketmaster, for example, were to raise its ser-
vice charges above a certain level, there would be a point at which it
would simply price itself out of the market. 0 2 Both customers and the
venues putting on the shows would turn to alternative sources of ticket
distribution if Ticketmaster began charging exorbitant service fees.
10 3
In United States v. Syufy Enterprises, the court held that even
though the defendant possessed a monopoly share of movie theaters
in the relevant market, this alone was not sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act since there was no resultant decrease in
competition. 10 4 Because of the low barriers to entry in this market,
the essential elements of power to set prices and power to exclude
competition were not present, and the government was not able to
make out a Sherman Act monopoly case against Syufy. 10 5 The court
also found significant that although Syufy possessed a territorial
monopoly, the company always treated the consumers fairly regarding
prices and services. 10 6
If an intrabrand competitor like X neither has the requisite
monopoly power to control prices and exclude competition, nor
abuses its market share in order to treat consumers unfairly (espe-
cially since this would be counter to their best interests), it is unlikely
that such a company will be found to be a monopoly in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
101 This could just as easily apply to our example of X and Ycar dealers. It could
be the case that X must sell a given car for at least a specified amount set by the
manufacturer, and any amount captured by the dealership over the manufacturer's
cost would be a profit to the dealership.
102 Likewise, if X began placing high premiums on its luxury car inventory, there
would be a point at which even those with a strong desire to get behind the wheel of a
new car would look elsewhere for a better deal.
103 How courts view the relevant market in any given vertical restraint case will
affect a dealer's incentive to charge monopoly-like prices above what the manufac-
turer/supplier wants. Taking a broad view of the relevant market, any given dealer
lacks a real incentive to charge monopoly-level prices or service charges. This is
because manufacturers have the prerogative to deny renewal of exclusive agreements
and instead contract with dealers willing to offer lower prices and service charges that
will better attract potential customers. However, as discussed in Part II.B, the analysis
would change if the conception of the market were narrowed to an aggregation of
each of the smaller monopolies that the exclusive distribution agreements would cre-
ate with each individual product or service. Ticketmaster, for example, would have
great leeway and incentive to raise service charge prices since all competition would
be barred for that particular show based on the exclusivity agreement. See infra notes
139-43 and accompanying text.
104 United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 671 (9th Cir. 1990).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 663.
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Much of the foregoing analysis has already addressed the require-
ments of an attempt to monopolize claim under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act; however, some further analysis regarding attempts to
monopolize claims would still be illuminating. Several courts, as well
as the Federal Trade Commission, take the stance that out of all the
required showings for an attempt claim, "the dangerous probability of
success should be considered as a threshold matter."'10 7 In making
this determination, courts generally look to "the same factors that they
consider in determining whether a defendant has sufficient market
power to be guilty of monopolization."'10 8 However, a lesser showing
is required in an attempt case.' 0 9 The principal factor in this analysis
is the defendant's share of the relevant market.110 Also, a showing of
significant entry barriers is also required in order to establish this
prong of the analysis."'
Assuming that a given intrabrand competitor like X did not have
the power to control prices in the market (because customers would
go elsewhere at a certain point) and assuming that there existed sur-
mountable (and thus insignificant) barriers to entry, a plaintiff dealer-
ship like Y would most likely be unable to make out a successful
"attempt to monopolize" claim against X given the threshold nature
of these requirements. Even assuming a specific intent to monopolize
and actions in furtherance of that goal, it does not appear that its
behavior would be sanctionable. Once again, a business like X could
evade judicial scrutiny based on the peculiarities of the market in
which it operates.
The ABA Section of Antitrust Law points out an interesting aspect
of the section 2 attempt claim that appears to apply directly to the
case at hand. It observed that "[o]ne implication of the dangerous
probability of success requirement is that it prevents Section 2 from
reaching unilateral conduct by a small firm that is unlikely to achieve
actual monopoly."'1 2 Thus, regardless of specific intent or anticompe-
titive conduct, if, given the realities of the market, a small firm has
little to no likelihood of achieving the desired monopoly, then there
could be no successful cause of action against it under either actual or
attempted section 2 monopolization claims. This is because the small
107 ABA SECTION OF ANTiTRUST LAVw, supra note 21, at 311 & nn.594-95.
108 Id. at 312.
109 Id. (citing Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir.
1995); Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1268 (E.D. Pa.
1987)).
110 See id. at 312 & n.598.
111 Id. at 315.
112 Id. at 317.
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firm would never achieve the requisite monopoly power under either
inquiry. Thus, "[i]f the objectionable conduct is unilateral, and thus
beyond the reach of Section 1, it may not be prohibited by the Sher-
man Act regardless of how egregious it is."
' 13
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE
INTRABRAND CONTEXT
This Part recommends a possible solution that can have a positive
impact on enforcement of anticompetitive conduct falling outside the
strict language of the rules, while violating their spirit. I explore the
Supreme Court's decision in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States as a
classic example of an anticompetitive vertical restraint case and con-
clude that courts should move beyond their current preoccupation
with economic and procompetitive impacts on the interbrand mar-
ket.114 Courts handling such cases should focus on alternative ways of
considering the intrabrand problem, especially when it is the distribu-
tor who wishes to impose the vertical restraint on its supplier, and not
the other way around.
The Court's preoccupation with anticompetitive effects on inter-
brand competition in the case of nonprice vertical restraints has insu-
lated what should be branded and enforced under the Sherman Act
as anticompetitive conduct by distributors. 115 The problem for the
most part is that courts overlook the initial stage of exclusive dealing
arrangements-the formation of the agreement itself-in considering
the reasonableness of a restraint. Why should it be the case that so
113 Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply to unilateral conduct.
114 In Lorain, a local newspaper was the sole method of advertisement to the
Lorain community until a nearby radio station was created and began accepting
advertisements from businesses that also advertised with the newspaper. Lorain Jour-
nal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1951). Likewise, X, or any firm simi-
larly situated, would want to become the sole distributor of luxury automobiles in this
geographic area in order to capitalize on monopoly-level prices, just as Lorain wished
to preserve its current advertising prices instead of having to compete with the radio
station. Through this comparison, several salient parallels are drawn out which pro-
vide a useful rubric by which to hold a firm like X liable when it would otherwise
evade antitrust law enforcement.
115 Building off of his model for addressing Sherman Act section 2 underenforce-
ment with regard to vertical restraints, I find it more convenient to make use of Ken-
neth Glazer's "coercive" and "incentivizing" conduct terminology when considering
the formation and maintenance of distributor-centric exclusivity agreements. See
Glazer & Henry, supra note 79, at 46; Kenneth L. Glazer, Three Key Distinctions
Under Section 2: Written Testimony of Kenneth L. Glazer Before the Antitrust Mod-
ernization Commission 6 (Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Glazer Statement], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission-hearings/pdf/Glazer.pdf.
[VOL. 84:2
INTRABRAND SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
long as there is "a modicum of interbrand competition,"' 16 the rule of
reason analysis employed by the courts would allow a distributor 17 to
enforce anticompetitive restraints by means of refusals to deal and
exclusive dealership termination whenever a firm in the vertical distri-
bution chain tries to carry a competing firm's product?1 18 In the years
after Sylvania, and in the wake of the proliferation of the rule of rea-
son, "a surplus of anticompetitive vertical restraints is tolerated . . .
because courts almost always find a priori or abstract legitimate busi-
ness justifications for them."119 Moreover, as argued above, 120 too
often a firm will evade enforcement of the Sherman Act by virtue of its
not meeting the letter of the law regarding some element of anticom-
petitive behavior, such as the requisite market power for a monopoly
claim. 121
A. Eliminating Enforcement Loopholes by Focusing on Coercive Conduct
One way to give teeth to the rule of reason standard as applied to
section 2 monopoly claims is by focusing on coercive conduct. 122
Lorain provides a close analogy to our car dealership example. There,
the defendant, Lorain Journal, owned the town's only competitive
daily newspaper. 123 At the time, running advertisements in this paper
was essential for local businesses to spread the word about their prod-
ucts and services. 124 This remained true until 1948, when WEOL
radio station was approved by the FCC to operate in a town a short
distance from Lorain, and it began to accept advertiscment business
from Lorain businesses that wanted both print and radio coverage.' 25
In order to protect its monopoly on the Lorain advertising market,
116 Burns, supra note 10, at 914.
117 The rule of reason is usually applied in the case of a "manufacturer" who wants
to impose a restraint on trade. However, given the fact that it is often the distributor
(be it X, Ticketmaster, or any other similarly situated company) that would be exercis-
ing its market influence over the supplier/manufacturer of a particular product, I
believe that the analysis works in both directions and thus it is just as accurate to
replace manufacturer with "distributor."
118 Richard Hardack, What They Don't Want You to Hear: Beltone, Ticketmaster,
and Exclusive Dealing, 9 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 284, 287 (2003).
119 Id. at 285.
120 See supra Part II.C.
121 Hardack, supra note 118, at 285.
122 See generally Glazer & Henry, supra note 79 (arguing that coercive conduct giv-
ing rise to forced exclusive dealing agreements ought to be forbidden under section 2
of the Sherman Act).
123 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 146 (1951).
124 Id. at 152 (calling the newspaper "an indispensable medium of advertising").
125 Id. at 147-48.
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the newspaper began refusing to accept advertisements from busi-
nesses that also advertised on WEOL, knowing that these businesses
depended on the local print advertising.
126
In much the same way, X could potentially force Yfrom the mar-
ket by requiring that the manufacturers deal with it exclusively. Imag-
ine that the majority of luxury car makers use X as their dealer
because of its dominant physical presence in the market. Then, Y
comes along and begins offering a new method of selling cars-over
the Internet. Of course, these manufacturers want as much distribu-
tion as possible and want to take advantage of the online car-sales mar-
ket; yet X wants to protect its monopoly on distribution and so
requires all of its suppliers to sell their cars exclusively through it or
refuses to do businesses with them.
If analyzed under the boycott schema of Lorain, it is likely that
such conduct would be found violative of section 2, regardless of
whether or not it is a group boycott per se.127 Furthermore, what is
underlying this unreasonable restraint of trade is the fact that it was
born of coercive conduct. X, much like the Lorain Journal, would
essentially be saying "take it or leave it," thus leaving the customer
(the manufacturer in this case) with no alternative as X already owns
the prime car-selling locations around town.
128
It would also be useful for the courts to view this coercive conduct
in light of a refusal to deal. For example, in United States v. Dentsply
International, Inc.,129 the court applied the following test in concluding
that Dentsply-the dominant manufacturer in the American artificial
teeth market-violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by not permit-
126 Id. at 148. This policy conceivably gave rise to exclusive dealing arrangements
by which the businesses agreed not to advertise with any competitor of the newspaper.
"The program was effective." Id. at 149. The court held that "[tihe publisher's
attempt to regain its monopoly of interstate commerce by forcing advertisers to boy-
cott a competing radio station violated § 2." Id. at 152.
127 See Glazer Statement, supra note 115, at 6-7 ("What [Lorain] did ... was the
equivalent of the classic group boycott .... Because of its monopoly power, the
newspaper was able to achieve the same result .... [W]hatever the label[,] . . . [it is]
a refusal to deal with a customer or supplier that does business with a competitor.").
But see Hardack, supra note 118, at 287 ("A vertical restraint, wherein, e.g., 'a supplier
or dealer makes an agreement exclusively to supply or serve a manufacturer, is not a
group boycott .... ' (quoting U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d
589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993))).
128 The above example in its entirety would be no different had the case involved
Ticketmaster. Using its superior presence in the market and ability to reach custom-
ers, Ticketmaster could be attaining its exclusive ticking agreements by means of coer-
cive conduct and take-it-or-leave-it demands on venues.
129 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
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ting its distributors to carry other denture brands: "whether the chal-
lenged practices bar a substantial number of rivals or severely restrict
the market's ambit."'1 30 Turning this analysis around, yet preserving
its force, it could be that X was imposing on the manufacturers
prohibitions on dealing with any of X's rival distributors in order to
continue doing business with them.
The designations are not quite as important as the fact that the
manufacturers are X's customers insofar as they use its car distribution
services. In Dentsply, the fact remained that even "in spite of the legal
ease with which the relationship can be terminated, the dealers have a
strong economic incentive to continue carrying Dentsply's teeth," and
therefore "the rivals simply could not provide dealers with a compara-
ble economic incentive to switch." 131 Likewise, even if X did not have
a monopoly under section 2, but Ycould not overcome the economic
incentive or provide a better deal to the car makers that would entice
them away from dealing exclusively with X, it is likely that a court,
using coercive conduct as a factor, would find X liable for its anticom-
petitive behavior. This is because under such an analysis the court
would no longer be overlooking the underlying impact of the agree-
ment at the intrabrand level by simply focusing on the procompetitive
impacts on the interbrand market. It is possible that the agreement
Dentsply had with its distributors had a procompetitive impact.
Courts, however, should no longer ignore the fact that such an agree-
ment came to be as a result of a firm's use of its indispensability in
order to present the customers with "an offer they couldn't refuse."
According to the Third Circuit, the "test is not total foreclosure, but
whether the challenged practices bar a substantial number of rivals or
severely restrict the market's ambit."1
32
B. Expanding the Coercive Conduct Analysis Beyond Monopolies
Though Mr. Glazer,13 3 in his statement before the Antitrust Mod-
ernization Commission, argues that the coercive conduct rubric can
only apply in cases of monopolies and, thus, section 2 of the Sherman
Act,1 34 this Note argues its scope is broad enough to cover section 1-
130 Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 185, 191.
131 Id. at 194-95.
132 Id. at 191.
133 Kenneth L. Glazer was a competition lawyer for Coca-Cola before being
appointed Deputy Director of the Bureau of Competition. See Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Glazer and Wales Appointed Deputy Directors of Bureau of Competi-
tion (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/03/deputydirectors.
shtm.
134 See Glazer Statement, supra note 115, at 8.
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unreasonable restraints of trade. As seen thus far, the anticompetitive
behavior of intrabrand distributors seeking exclusive distributorships
will not always be strictly unilateral. 135 Granted, any refusals to deal
on the distributor's part would be unilateral, but if the suppliers/man-
ufacturers go ahead with the exclusive agreement, the firms have
entered into Sherman Act section 1 territory.
Applying the coercive conduct inquiry in the context of section 1
will protect the intrabrand market from the anticompetitive effects of
exclusive dealing arrangements between X and its manufacturers that
would otherwise destroy the ability of other distributors to compete.
If the court were to focus on any coercive conduct that gave rise to the
exclusive dealing arrangements, it would potentially enable injured
plaintiffs to prevail in situations where they were excluded from the
market, notwithstanding any positive impact on the interbrand
market.
The whole point of the coercive conduct model as applied here is
to shift the court's focus away from its traditional concerns under Syl-
vania and its progeny, and to realize that reduction in competition at
the intrabrand level could itself have deleterious effects on the down-
stream consumer and, thus, the market as a whole.1 36 If X, or any firm
in its position, were left to its own devices to completely cut out com-
petition at the distributor level, it would be free to charge monopoly-
level premiums on each car sale. The intrabrand market can no
longer be ignored and be subject to the rather lenient rule of reason
standard. Rather, this Note suggests some level of increased scrutiny
in between per se illegality and the rule of reason. 13 7 However, it may
be wise to avoid a strict liability rule because there are situations
wherein a procompetitive justification of great magnitude will exist
such that the coercive conduct at the intrabrand level would be worth
overlooking.
Finally, the coercive conduct analysis should extend beyond situa-
tions involving monopolies because it would help to address those sit-
uations where a firm that comports with the letter of the law, but
135 Their exclusivity agreements require the acceptance of the particular manufac-
turer with which they are attempting to deal.
136 According to Mr. Glazer, this method of scrutiny is beneficial because it
"focuses on the conduct itself rather than effects or intent or foreclosure .... By
focusing on the conduct itself, we put firms on notice, in advance, as to exactly what
they can and cannot do." Glazer Statement, supra note 115, at 9 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
137 Mr. Glazer goes further than I would by suggesting a per se rule based on his
view that the coercive conduct "hurts the customer and leaves the competitor with no
real options for responding." Id.
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violates its spirit, is able to avoid liability under the Sherman Act. This
pertains mostly to the issue of the relevant market and market power.
Above, this Note described various situations where a firm could evade
antitrust enforcement because of the peculiarities of the market, thus
falling somewhere between section 1 and section 2 enforcement. 38
A solution lies in a suggestion made by Mr. Hardack in his article
with regard to defining the relevant market for imposing antitrust lia-
bility on Ticketmaster. If one were to look at a given intrabrand mar-
ket as a whole, such as Ticketmaster's concert ticketing market, it is
possible to rationalize that given the number of shows that need ticket
distribution services and the relative ease with which one can set up a
telephone or internet ticketing system, the barriers to entry are not
prohibitively high. Likewise, a business like X could not preclude
entry overall, especially when its exclusivity agreements come due
every so often. Even if it did, it is not as though it is putting large,
Fortune 500 companies out of business in doing so.139
However, in the case of Ticketmaster, if the market were nar-
rowed to only "each self-contained show at each venue,"1 40 then courts
would have ample grounds to enforce anticompetitive behavior where
the firm might have otherwise evaded liability. The rationale behind
treating each ticketing agreement for a particular show as an individ-
ual market is that "a ticket buyer can not substitute a ticket to one
show for another."'141 Each show, and thus each corresponding agree-
ment, is a separate entity and, therefore, if the arrangement is one of
exclusive dealing, then the ticket distributor's competitors would be
completely barred from this market, albeit a narrow one.
Consequently, an intrabrand ticketing business like Ticketmaster
could fix prices in the form of ticketing service charges particular to
this one show-thereby establishing the much-needed market power
in order to find the firm in violation of the Sherman Act. 142 As
Hardack compellingly argues, "[A]nticompetitive vertical restraints
should not be tolerated merely because the victim is a single merchant
whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference
138 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
139 However, "[m]onopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small
businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups." Hardack,
supra note 118, at 289.
140 Id. at 318.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 289 ("While the markets may remain separate or incommensurate,
the harms should be aggregated if their effect is as great or greater than the harm a
single monopolist with market power can cause.").
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to the economy. '143 Despite the fact that the elimination from the
market of a business like Ys would not have a profound ripple effect
in the economy, courts should take care to enforce the Sherman Act
in those cases. Such vigilance reflects the importance of monitoring
coercive conduct among firms and urges courts to look beyond eco-
nomic effects and more toward the underlying fairness of vertical
transactions in order to prevent violations of the spirit of the antitrust
laws, if not their letter.
CONCLUSION
Courts that wish to properly enforce the procompetitive spirit of
the Sherman Act should no longer ignore the anticompetitive impact
of vertical nonprice restraints of trade on intrabrand competition.
Through the examples of X and Y car dealerships, movie clearances,
and Ticketmaster, this Note has shown how such agreements can elim-
inate firms from the distribution market while avoiding liability
because of market-specific peculiarities and the courts' adherence to
Chicago School preoccupations with interbrand competition alone.
By choosing not to factor into their Sherman Act analysis rele-
vant, pre-contract formation behaviors such as coercive conduct,
courts are allowing firms like X to dominate the distribution market
without repercussions. Additionally, courts must reassess their
notions of what constitutes the relevant market in exclusive dealership
cases, because even though a dealer may not dominate an entire mar-
ket from a bird's eye view, it may have effectively created a series of
small monopolies, one for each venue and show it tickets, as is the
case with Ticketmaster. 144 Courts' categorization of exclusive vertical
intrabrand agreements as irrelevant to antitrust analysis will (and
probably already has) result in less intrabrand competition and thus
higher service charges and prices for downstream customers. Movie
143 Id.
144 The same- can be expanded to the car dealership hypothetical. Even if X is
unable to procure exclusive dealership agreements with all of the luxury car dealers
in a particular region, each individual agreement can be looked at as a monopoly in
and of itself. This is the case if the relevant market is narrowed to just one kind of
luxury car in a given region. Therefore, instead of thinking of the market as the
luxury automobile market in City A, we would consider the market for Mercedes or
BMW as individual markets relevant to the antitrust analysis outlined in this Note.
Therefore, Xcan have a monopoly, not in the luxury car market, but in the Mercedes
Benz market or the BMW market as a result of exclusive dealership agreements that
only allow X to sell this particular brand in this region. The Sherman Act would have
a much stronger bite in the intrabrand market if this were how courts viewed the
relevant market.
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theater patrons, concertgoers, and luxury car buyers beware-the
courts' eschewing of the importance of intrabrand competition is rais-
ing prices at a dealer near you.
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